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Literature Review  
 
Introduction 
 In 2011 the International Energy Agency issued a report projecting that the global 
atmosphere is on track for 6 degrees Celsius of warming, representing abrupt, unpredictable, and 
potentially irreversible changes in environmental feedback systems (IPPC 2001, 2007), causing 
consequences such as shifting weather patterns that threaten food production through increased 
unpredictability of rainfall, rising sea levels that will have a range of impacts on coastal 
environments and infrastructure, and extreme weather events, predicted to become more frequent 
and severe. Therefore, it is essential for individual states, and the international community, to 
engage in climate change mitigation policies, which the United Nations defines as “efforts to 
reduce or prevent the emission of greenhouse gases,” including using new technologies, 
renewable energies, improving equipment efficiency, or changing management practices or 
consumer behavior (UNFCCC).  
 Unfortunately, climate change mitigation policy suffers from a paradox: Climate change 
is generally regarded as a low national security priority, yet the international scientific 
community stresses human-contributed climate change as a very serious problem (IPPC 2001, 
2007). Since the year 2000, numerous public opinion polls in the United States “demonstrate that 
large majorities of Americans are aware of global warming (92 percent), believe that global 
warming is real and already underway (74 percent), believe that there is a scientific consensus on 
the reality of climate change (61 percent), and already view climate change as a some what to 
very serious problem (76 percent)” (Leiserowitz 2003). However, according to a 2014 Gallup 
poll, the majority of Americans worry “only a little” or “not at all” about global warming (Gallup 
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2014), viewing it as less important than nearly all other national or environmental issues 
(Lorenzoni 2007). This phenomenon is not only confined to the United States. Over 99 percent 
of the English public have heard of either “climate change,” “global warming,” or the 
“greenhouse effect” and, most people say they are aware of the main causes of climate change 
and are concerned about it, yet a small minority of democratic citizens demand climate change 
mitigation policy from their legislators (DEFRA 2002, 2005). What explains the discrepancy in 
public perception about the severity of climate change and the willingness to solve the problem? 
And how can this explanation be utilized to effect changes in policy? 
 The literature explaining environmental policy implementation points to an extensive list 
of contributory factors, but generally fails to pinpoint a select few that are the most influential in 
affecting policy outcomes. I argue that the many variables identified in the literature merely 
influence the public’s perception of environmental policies, and that a positive perception, one 
that understands environmental regulation to be economically beneficial in the long-run 
(Bovenberg & Smulders 1996), is a significant determinant of a state’s ability to implement 
regulatory environmental policy.  
 I will examine which of these factors within the international and national communities 
most affect public perception of environmental regulatory and climate change mitigation 
policies, thereby creating guiding principles that states might reference in order to move toward 
improving public perception and enacting mitigation policy. I will hypothesize that these factors, 
or precursor variables, contribute to a public perception of climate change mitigation that 
ultimately allows for the success or failure of policy implementation.  
 
A Brief History of International Climate Conferences 
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 The principal forum for international climate change action is the United Nations, 
specifically the Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which oversees 
international climate conventions, one of the first being the 1997 Kyoto Protocol1. Kyoto began 
an international discussion on cooperative solutions to climate change, yet its mandatory 
language failed to achieve meaningful resolutions. It hoped to reduce greenhouse gases 
substantially, but today the world has over 60 percent more greenhouse gases than it did in 1990, 
as opposed to the five percent reduction its signatories sought (BBC News 2014). The top-down 
approach of the United Nations, and subsequently of the Protocol, imposed generic and 
internationally legally binding pollution reductions on participating countries. Most 
responsibility for emissions reductions was shouldered on wealthier developed nations, 
“recognizing that developed countries are principally responsible for the current high levels of 
GHG emissions in the atmosphere as a result of more than 150 years of industrial activity,” 
under the principle of “common but differentiated responsibility” (UNFCCC). Some of the key 
participating countries, and largest emitters, including the United States, did not meet their 
Protocol commitment. Thus the Kyoto Protocol is largely regarded as empty international 
legislation, lacking the enforceability its strategy required (CBCNews 2012). 
 The Copenhagen Peace Talks signified another global commitment to curb the effects of 
climate change. The talks allowed individual states to submit and commit to their own reduction 
strategies to achieve the “long-term goal of limiting the maximum global average temperature 
increase to no more than 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels” (UNFCCC). The 
provisions of the accord called for 186 states to reduce emissions, invest in clean energy 
technology and practices, and help people adapt to the effects of climate change. All 
                                                 
1 The first was in Berlin, Germany in 1995 (UNFCCC). A Conference Of the Parties meets every 
year beginning with this date, and thus I will only highlight the most notable meetings. 
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participatory parties to the Copenhagen Accord submitted their respective emission reduction 
goals in January of 2010. The final accord included 141 countries, including the 27-member 
European Union, representing 87.24 percent of global emissions (U.S. Climate Action Network 
2014). This agreement was both more successful at a participatory level and less effective than 
the Kyoto Protocol. While the Accords allowed individual states to determine their own policies, 
which allowed them to set realistic and achievable goals, it was ultimately ineffective, as 
emission levels are currently approaching the increase in global temperatures toward Kyoto’s “2 
degrees Celsius” magic standard, which was an arbitrarily set standard in the first place 
(UNCCC). 
 In December of 2015, an unprecedented 195 states agreed upon another internationally 
binding climate change reduction strategy at the COP21 Paris Climate Conference. The 
agreement acts as a “parent treaty” to the Kyoto Protocol, committing participating countries to 
submitting climate action plans, or National Determined Contributions, every five years, that will 
immediately begin to decrease emissions so that global atmosphere temperatures will increase no 
more than 1.5 degrees Celsius. The plan also increases economic support for developing 
countries, both in mitigation and in climate impact loss and damage (UNCCC). While a 
participatory commitment of this level is unprecedented, it remains to be seen if these states will 
follow through on their commitments, especially in the scope of the vast history of unsuccessful 
environmental policy cooperation.  
 Much of the literature attempting to analyze the lack of success of these international 
agreements fails to prescribe a comprehensive solution. Perhaps these meetings are not the 
solution at all, given the specificity of different environmental issues, political differences within 
each country, lack of international enforceability, and difficulty in balancing industrial 
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development and emissions controls. I argue that only through a more localized approach, one 
beginning from the public level up through the national political level, will countries be able to 
achieve the emissions reductions they work towards in international climate conferences.  
 To understand how a country might achieve these reductions, we must begin to 
understand what national factors inhibit these achievements. A major inhibitor of public support 
for climate change mitigation policy is the argument that it prevents economic development or 
hinders international trade competition with nations that choose not to implement the same 
policies. While there is some conflict on this issue in the literature, the most recent conclusion 
states that while environmental regulation may negatively inhibit employment and productivity 
in the short run, that in the long run, these effects are negligible, if at all present (Raupach & 
Marland 2007). Older research points to an irreconcilable discrepancy between international 
competitiveness and environmental regulation because it would necessarily impose higher costs 
upon private producers, discouraging economic growth. For example, a simulation of the growth 
of the U.S. economy with and without regulation that analyzed the repercussions of 
environmental regulations upon industries found that the cost of emission controls is more than 
10 percent of the total cost of government purchase of goods and services between 1973-1985. 
However, the simulation did not attempt to assess the benefits resulting from a cleaner 
environment and did not include the modern clean energy innovations that are more cost 
effective than their dirtier alternatives (Jaffe et al. 1995) (Bovenburg et. al 1996).  
 Current literature pays greater attention to the social benefits, such as improved health, of 
environmental regulation, which often outweigh any immediate economic costs (Dechezlepretre 
& Sato 2014). A focus on long term social benefits rather than immediate economic benefits 
better encompasses the full scope of impacts upon society as well as upon the environment. One 
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study found that long run income growth, and/or long run output of the economy as measured by 
Gross National Product, increases2 as a result of environmental policy implementation 
(Bovenberg & Smulders 1996) (Jorgenson & Wilcoxen 1989). Environmental regulation also 
stimulates innovation in clean technologies. For example, recent low-carbon technology 
development induces greater economic benefits than do the “dirty” technologies that it replaces, 
encouraging greater and greener economic growth (Dechezlepretre & Sato 2014). Several state-
level studies found positive correlations among state rankings on economic and environmental 
indicators and conclude that the states that do the most to protect their environment also have the 
strongest economies (Hall 1994; Meyer 1992).  
 Whether these findings are correlative or causal, or due to other economic factors, it 
appears that the key for significantly lower rates of environmental degradation may be the 
existence of compensation for potential losers of policies that promote conservation as well as 
long term economic growth, as was the case in a study focusing on Brazilian deforestation 
solutions (Carmen Lemos et. al 2008). If actors such as ENGOs are able to communicate the 
economic and social benefits of regulatory policies to the greater public, I argue that they may be 
able to correct public misconceptions of environmental regulation and move toward policy that 
mitigates the effects of climate change.  
 
Factors that determine perception 
Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations 
 Non-Governmental Organizations represent a potentially powerful tool in environmental 
policy creation and implementation. While NGO effectiveness is determined by a wide variety of 
                                                 
2 at an annual rate of .728 percent 
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logistical factors, such as funding, staff availability, accessibility to office space, relations with 
government representatives, access to means of communication, lobbying capability, and 
already-existing public support for the issue (Nasiritousi et. al 2014) (Gough & Shackley 2001), 
the literature suggests that the presence of strong and numerous environmental non-
governmental organizations (ENGOs) within a state contribute to an ENGO’s ability to influence 
environmental policy outcomes. For example, Najam et. al identify ENGOs as “demandeurs of 
more and better environmental governance” that nurture public concern through the decisions of 
environmental non-governmental organizations (2004, 23). The study correctly concludes that 
ENGOs have become a principal vehicle of global environmental policy monitoring; they also 
contribute to the “drafting and implementing of national strategies and regulations; serve as 
technical advisors to governmental negotiators, especially in developing countries; and are a 
primary vehicle for environmental capacity building” (Najam et. al 2014, 27). 
 Non-governmental organizations in general have unique access to intellectual, 
membership, political, financial bases, transnational networking, and mobilization capacity, 
which comprise a set of power sources that allow NGOs to gain authority in national governance. 
ENGOs are no different. A review of literature identifies five sources of ENGO powers, an 
understanding that clarifies the ways in which they can be most effective: cognitive, symbolic, 
social, leverage, and material powers (Nasiritousi et. al 2014). Material powers, represented by 
funding levels, provide leverage and lobbying capacity toward formal governmental institutions. 
ENGOs draw strength from their cognitive and social powers because of their issue-specific 
focus and large membership capacity. An ENGO can employ symbolic power if it is perceived to 
represent public opinion that is not represented elsewhere, such as adding a voice for the 
environment or for future generations (Gough & Shackley 2001). A focus on perception is useful 
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in understanding the success or failure of the causal path between ENGO advocacy for a policy 
and that policy’s failure or success. For example, an analysis of 4 periods of environmental 
policy-making in the Amazonian region of Brazil found that pro-environmental policy plans 
must be perceived as a potential source of economic or other type of resource for that policy to 
reach successful implementation (Carmen Lemos et. al 2008). This insight on perception will be 
greatly useful in my theoretical framework.  
International and Political Elite Support 
 Several studies point to the type and level of support a policy receives as important 
factors in its outcome. Since there are hundreds of different theories about how elites affect the 
political opinions of citizens, I simply describe the general form by saying that some form of 
elite communication is hypothesized to affect a specific aspect of individual opinion. This 
hypothesis can be thought of as occurring, and being supported, at two levels of interaction. At 
the upper level, the world’s governments interact strategically, each seeking to benefit from the 
global climate change regime while reducing their costs, as exemplified in the series of COP 
international meetings previously discussed. Since there is no international authority with strong 
sanctioning power, this can be considered a “game” of voluntary contributions toward a public 
good: climate change mitigation and adaptation (“Climate Change Governance: Understanding 
Agency through Governance Profiles” 2014). The upper level, international context, will affect 
how, and if, governments approach climate policy. For example, the COP21 meeting in 
November of 2015 sparked significant media attention, which may generate greater public 
support for climate change mitigation policy. Several studies indicate that during one of these 
international conferences, environmental regulatory policies are more likely to be implemented 
in the participatory nations (Meadowcroft 1999). Alternatively, or in addition, political elites in 
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attendance at the meeting may directly advocate for policy implementation within their own 
national governments.  
  While the upper level certainly begins an international discussion on the need to reduce 
emissions, political elite support at the lower level can have a larger effect upon public 
perception of environmental policy (Lorenzoni et. al 2007). At this level, climate policies are 
formulated and implemented within each country by national governments once the international 
level is settled. This level is more difficult to quantify and to define because of the many elite 
political players that could advocate for or against environmental policy. 
 One study demonstrates how both levels of support can work together to affect policy 
implementation through the analysis of a coalition for sustainable development in the Amazon 
forest, which included international and domestic ENGOs, supportive officials within the World 
Bank, western developed countries, Brazilian governments, epistemic communities of scientists, 
and grass-roots groups such as rubber tappers and indigenous people. After a COP summit, 
political elites and other groups began to organize and attempt to implement legislation 
preventing Amazonian deforestation. The different actions of each group of people were not 
separated out by the study, likely because it is so difficult to do so. 
 A Nepalese study tracking political elite commitment to the environment after its 
democratization in 1992 found that elite members identified political and economic problems 
before those of environmental degradation, and that “the precarious ecology of the country 
cannot be improved without tackling economic hardships” simultaneously. The study, like that of 
Carmen Lemos et. al, cites the polarized nature of politics as a likely harmful cause to 
environmental policy development, although the two articles diverge in their conclusions in 
regard to the effect of elite support. The Nepal case study regrettably does not measure the 
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likelihood that greater environmental support by the elite politicians would contribute to policy 
implementation (Steel & Pandey 1999)3, and thus is not as useful as it could be for my 
theoretical approach. 
 International and political elite support play an important role in policy outcome, but is 
very difficult to measure. Carmen Lemos et. al recommend an approach in which international 
support for and pressure upon opposing interests advocate for concrete benefits that “compensate 
for what is perceived as forgone opportunities for development and strongly shift economic 
incentives and provide local social development,” but does not specify a concrete method in 
which to measure political elite support. The study concludes that developmental policies in the 
Amazon depended upon, along with resources and international support, political elite member 
support (Carmen Lemos et. al 2008). This approach simultaneously overcomes the economic 
argument most often used to impede policy implementation and employs one of the major factors 
that influence public perception, making it a useful study for my theory. Similarly, Brulle et al. 
identify elite political cues as “the most important influence on public concern about climate 
change” in the United States between 2002-2010, both originating from Democratic and 
Republican sources, “which led to a heightening and diminishing of public concern 
respectively,” although again, does not provide a formula for quantifying these political elite 
“cues” that is applicable on an international level (Stewart 2015).  
Media Cycles 
                                                 
3 Although the Nepalese government did establish a Ministry of the Environment in 1992 under 
the direction of the Prime Minister. An Agriculture, Forestry, and Environment Division was 
also established within the national Planning Commission, the most important government 
development and economic agency. The creation of an environmental sector within such an 
important development and economic body represents an early recognition of the 
interconnectedness of these issues by the Nepalese government. 
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 Media has the ability to draw public attention to particular issues; to shape and inform 
public opinion. If media cycles inform and focus upon the potential for policy action, a public is 
more likely to support climate change mitigation policy (Capstick 2015). The literature about the 
effect of media representations of climate change have mostly centered upon Western and 
developed states, likely due to characteristic media freedom that this group of countries enjoys, 
and is also confined to small regions within Western states. One of the only comprehensive 
studies in the field that analyses the effect of media cycles upon public perception of climate 
change on a variety of countries, distributed geographically throughout the world, still only 
provides case study data for 27 countries. The study concludes that media attention levels on 
climate change increased in all countries between 1996 and 2010, although to varying degrees, 
with media attention on climate change being especially high in carbon-dependent countries, 
with those most affected by climate change, and those with commitments under the Kyoto 
Protocol (Schäfer et. al 2012).  
 More polling data from non-Western regions, as well as regional data specifically 
focused upon African and South American regions, would be desirable to conclusively state the 
causal relationship between media and public perception of environmental policy. However, a 
greater amount of literature resoundingly relates media attention to public opinion in general 
(Capstick 2015), and I believe that this relationship partly fills, if not completely, any gap that 
exists for specific issues, such as environmental policy.  
 
Summation 
 A survey of the literature points to a variety of variables that influence environmental 
policy implementation, however I identify the most common three and propose that instead of 
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directly influencing policy, that these factors influence public perception of environmental 
policy, and that a positive perception is the key to successful implementation in a variety of 
states. The existing literature does not present a practical set of goals that actors could attempt to 
achieve if it were interested in improving its climate change mitigation policies, and it is my 
hope to provide this to the existing body of literature. A bottom-up focus, one that begins with 
public perception, corrects for the unenforceability and generality of international accords, which 
certainly influence policy, but cannot function as a complete solution for the destructive effects 
climate change will bring. Once negative perceptional barriers are removed, namely the false 
idea that national environmental regulations create economic stagnation, countries have a greater 
likelihood of implementing climate change mitigation policy. Of course, confounding factors 
such as war or political conflict within a country would also impede the potential for positive 
perception building. Further analysis of the effects of these confounding factors, specifically 
upon environmental policy, would better inform this review.  
 Although it seems over-simplistic to identify two factors that determine environmental 
policy perception, it is important to note the complexity existing both within the relationships 
between the factors as well as in the world of environmental policy governance, of which any 
literature review cannot hope to comprehensively encompass. Rather, it is my goal to review the 
previous failures of global environmental policy implementation, and to provide a concise 
solution. I formulate the most important explanatory components within a new framework of 
perception, providing a potential pathway for actors within this complex system to follow in 
order to mitigate the damaging effects of climate change.  
 
Theoretical Framework and Design 
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 This paper will explain the presence or absence of climate change mitigation policy by 
constructing a series of precursor variables that build a positive public perception of climate 
change mitigation policy. These variables include: the number of environmental non-
governmental organizations (ENGOs), and media attention upon climate change. I hypothesize 
that positive or strong values in these variables contribute to a positive public perception about 
climate change mitigation, which in turn results in policy implementation within democratic 
states.  
 I will operationalize and analyze the relationship between a series of precursor 
independent variables and my overarching variable, public perception of environmental policy. I 
will then analyze the relationship between this variable and environmental policy 
implementation. The first precursor variable is environmental non-governmental organizations. 
ENGOs shape public opinion by accruing and organizing public perception, through its direct 
lobbying and organizational tools. The second is media issue attention, which draws positive or 
negative attention to issues such as climate change, and have the power to create a positive 
discourse and to circulate either facts or myths about a topic. These factors contribute to an 
overarching independent variable, that of public perception of environmental policies. 
 It is possible that the presence of strong and numerous ENGOs is a product of a positive 
public perception of climate change policy, rather than a precursor. Some studies point to 
intrinsically more civically minded populations within democracies, such as the United States, 
that allow it to have relatively successful climate change mitigation policy. Thus a public that 
already favors climate change mitigation policy could form ENGOs, thus reversing the causal 
chain of my argument for this particular dependent variable. However, the long-term existence of 
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ENGOs in the United States predate data showing public concern for climate change, and thus I 
conclude that this is unlikely. Instead, the literature understands ENGOs to shape public opinion 
through and around perception, or directly through lobbying (Nasiritousi et. al 2014).  
 In addition, alternative causal relationships could exist between and among my precursor 
independent variables. It is possible that the presence of a strong ENGO and lobbying force 
could explain frequent climate change articles published. 
 I will build a theory by focusing on three cases, intentionally selecting cases with climate 
change policies that vary maximally, in quality and quantity, according to my scale. I will focus 
on democracies in order to best measure public perception on climate change mitigation policies 
and media attention to climate change, both of which might be inaccurately measured or 
influenced by an authoritarian regime. Based on a review of the literature, I will build a theory 
by analyzing the United States, Germany, and India, as cases because they represent the greatest 
variety in environmental policy efforts, as well as a wide arena of emissions sector emphases. 
Variable Operationalization 
 To operationalize the actual implementation of these policies, I will create my own 
ranking system that will assign numerical values, from one to five, one being assigned to the 
state with the most effective climate change mitigation policies, based upon the qualitative and 
quantitative merits of the state’s policies. Based on the below criteria, I will identify and evaluate 
the most recent climate change mitigation policies from three different nations that vary 
maximally. 
Implemented Climate Change Mitigation Policy Scale 
1. Presence of multiple climate change mitigation policies in effect, in all emissions sectors 
identified by the United Nations (transport, buildings, manufacturing, tourism, 
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agriculture, forestry, waste, energy supply/renewables), specifically focusing upon those 
sectors for which the state has particularly high levels of emissions. 
2.  Some climate change mitigation policies in effect, covering at least 4 of the sectors 
previously identified, specifically focusing upon the sector in which most emissions for 
that state occur. Multiple policies within each sector are present. 
3.  Some climate change mitigation policies in effect, covering at least 3 of the sectors 
previously identified. At least one area of policy that addresses most emission-intensive 
sector. 
4.  Some climate change mitigation policies in effect, at least 2 of the sectors previously 
identified. Possibly only one policy present in each sector represented. No focus upon 
most emission intensive sector. 
5. Lack of climate change mitigation policies in effect. Represented sectors only have one 
policy. Little or no variety in sectors. Lack of policy focus upon most emission-intensive 
sector(s). 
 I will track the number of ENGOs in a state, adjusted per capita, in order to 
operationalize this precursor independent variable. States with high numbers of ENGOs may also 
have highly ranked climate change mitigation policies. The most complete data set that measures 
the number and type of NGOs is the Encyclopedia of Associations: International Organizations, 
using search terms “climate change,” and “conservation,” or “environment”. The ENGOs are 
easily searchable and quantifiable by country, and the Encyclopedia accounts for the greatest 
number of ENGOs present in any accessible preexisting data set surveyed in the literature.  
 I will operationalize media attention by utilizing the data set compiled in the Schäfer 
study previously mentioned, which measures the number of media attention cycles in primary 
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national newspapers that focus upon climate change. This study compares the percentage of issue 
attention given to climate change in 27 countries over a time period of 15 years and provides the 
most comprehensive set of preexisting data available from all the literature reviewed. The study 
defines a reference to climate change in the media as existing when  
 a) The keyword ‘climate’ appears in connection with words indicating change (i.ee 
 change, development, warming, cooling);  
 b) The article includes word synonymous to climate change, such as ‘greenhouse effect’ 
 or ‘global warming’; or  
 c) When a global change of temperature is discussed. These conditions were 
 operationalized by broadly defined search-strings, which subsequently were employed for 
 full-text searches in electronic databases (Schäfer et al. 2012, 11). 
 
This study gathered data from the largest number of countries in all of the literature surveyed, 
and surveyed the largest amount of media sources. It also focuses on three countries as case 
studies, some of which will be used for this study. (Schäfer et. al 2012, 26).  
 The presence of political elite support or international support is difficult to 
operationalize. The only coherent way to do so in a quantifiable manner seems to ascertain if 
support exists, or not, for the climate policy in question. No systematic quantitative system exists 
within the literature, and therefore I can see no way of going around this problem other than to 
ignore this variable in my study, despite the likelihood that it in fact does influence perception of 
climate change and policy implementation. 
 I will measure public perception about climate change regulation, to which I hypothesize 
the precursor independent variables contribute, using World Values Survey data concerning 
responses to whether protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes 
slower economic growth and some loss of jobs. This question assesses public support for policies 
that protect the environment, thereby mitigating climate change, in the face of the greatest 
ideological and practical challenge to these policies. I expect to observe that the previously 
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mentioned contributory independent variables will cause positive public perception of climate 
change mitigation policy. 
 Based upon my case data, I expect to observe that the cases which have high levels of 
most or all precursor independent variables, i.e., high numbers of ENGOs relative to population, 
and high relative climate change media cycles, will significantly contribute to my primary 
independent variable, public support for climate change mitigation policy. Next, I hypothesize 
that states with high levels of public support will achieve high rankings in their climate change 
mitigation policies. 
 Confounding variables that could disrupt my causal flow include state regime type, its 
political conditions, and conflict in the state. An authoritarian state is unlikely to enjoy the same 
sort of public support for environmental policies, or attempt to achieve it, as do democracies. An 
authoritarian regime may also be less likely to collect data on public support for any issues. Thus 
I will focus only upon democracies for the cases in my study to control for regime type.  
 Political conditions, such as political instability, could disrupt my causal relationship 
between my dependent and independent variables because it can create public insecurity, a 
situation which may deemphasize public concern for policies other than those that directly 
increase personal security. Thus, media, ENGOs, and political elites or the international 
community deprioritize climate change policies in order to handle what they perceive as a more 
immediate threat. To control for political instability, I have selected cases with a democratic 
regime that has been in existence for at least fifteen years. 
 Similarly, conflicts such as war or drone attacks in a state are likely to divert public and 
political elite attention away from other national security issues such as climate change, and can 
disrupt the infrastructure of a state to the point that climate change mitigation is not a feasible 
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priority. Media cycles might focus more prominently on war or other violent conflicts instead of 
climate change mitigation policy, decreasing the media cycle quantity. ENGOs might not be as 
popular or have the ability to generate as much support in war-torn states. Likewise, political 
elites and the international community might focus less upon climate change mitigation policy in 
a country with constant violence. Therefore, war will be controlled for by selecting cases in 
which it is not present (directly in that country) to prevent it from skewing the results of my 
study. My study will be limited to democratic countries in which data for public support for 
climate change mitigation policy is available, however I would argue that if my hypothesis is 
correct, that it could even help guide authoritarian regimes interested in reducing their emissions. 
I am excluding them purely due to a lack of data availability.  
 While it would be desirable to assess the environmental literacy, defined as “the number 
of individuals capable of making informed decisions concerning the environment…in order to 
improve the well-being of other individuals and societies” of a population (Environmental 
Literacy | NAAEE), this data is extremely limited on an international level. It currently only 
appears to exist for small populations or communities on a regional or local level, and even at 
that it usually centers upon a short range of particular educational levels. Therefore this variable 




 South Africa has relatively high emissions for a developing country, largely due to its 
coal-intensive energy structure and dependence on mining and minerals processing. A leading 
international assessment of the effects of climate change on the global economy, the Stern 
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Review, estimates that national economic damages from unmitigated climate change could range 
between 5 percent and 20 percent of South African Gross Domestic Product (GDP) annually by 
2100. If South African emissions remain unchecked, they could quadruple by 2050 (National 
Climate Change Response White Paper 2011, 26). 
 South African climate change mitigation policy was evaluated based upon its ability to 
target its most intensive emissions categories, being electricity, transportation, and industry. For 
example, average energy use emissions for a developing country usually comprises 49 percent of 
its total emissions, whereas South Africa’s energy use emissions sit just under 80 percent of its 
total emissions. Electricity generation constitutes half of South Africa’s energy emissions and 
just under 40 percent of total emissions in 2000. Transportation and energy used in industry 
contributed just under 10 percent, while industrial process emissions constituted around 14 
percent of total emissions. Agriculture and land-use change in South Africa make up 5 percent of 
its emissions (National Climate Change Response White Paper 2011, 25-29). South Africa’s 
mitigation policy identifies opportunities for mitigation in the “energy efficiency, demand 
management,” and moving to less emissions-intensive energies. It also expresses interest in 
incentivizing economic growth in sectors with lower energy intensities (National Climate 
Change Response White Paper 2011, 30). To achieve these, South Africa established a 
benchmark National GHG Emissions Trajectory Range, which details that South African 
emissions will peak between 2020 and 2025, remain stable for up to a decade, and then decline 
thereafter. Additionally, the policy implements a voluntary carbon budget program that would 
outline desired emission reduction outcomes for each sector of the economy, with emphasis on 
the major energy supply (electricity and liquid fuels) and use (mining, industry, and transport) 
sectors National Climate Change Response White Paper 2011, 25).  
Anderson 20 
However, the White Paper also emphasizes “equity and the common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities of all nations” and commits to making a “fair” 
contribution to the global effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (National Climate Change 
Response White Paper 2011, 27), indicating that the South African government may expect more 
developed countries to assume greater responsibility for atmospheric emissions reductions. 
Additionally, the White Paper requires “companies and economic sectors… [to] submit 
mitigation plans that set out how they intend to achieve the desired emission reduction 
outcomes” without setting up a timeframe within which these companies will be required to 
submit their plans and without establishing consequence for not doing so. Based on my scale, I 
gave South Africa’s mitigation portion of its policy a 3, because it covers several emissions 
sectors, and addresses two of its most emission-intensive sectors, being electricity, and industry, 
but fails to address transportation emissions or set definitive consequences or deadlines for 
failing to follow legal regulations. 
 According to the Encyclopedia of Associations, South Africa has a total of 24 
environmental non-governmental organizations, with a combined membership base of 14,125 
people, representing .03 percent of the South African population that is directly and actively 
involved in an ENGO.  
 Based on the media study conducted by Schäfer et al., the South African newspapers 
Sunday Times and The Star, saw increases in media attention on climate change-related issues 
increase from 1997 to 2010, with spikes in attention occurring during international climate 
conferences like COP meetings (Schäfer et al 2012, 20). Of the articles that were published by 
these newspapers from 2001-2009, .49 percent were focused on climate change, lower than the 
overall average of 27 countries of .6 percent (Schäfer et al. 2012, 20). 
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 I utilized 2010-2014 World Values Survey Data 
measuring perception of the environment as a priority, namely 
whether the 
environment should be 
given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth 
and some loss of jobs. I used this comparison as an 
indicator of support of environmental policies in general 
because, as discussed earlier, arguments against 
environmental protections are often made because they 
slow economic growth. Thus, a population that disagrees 
with this statement is more likely to support climate 
policies. Of 3,531 cases in South Africa, 38.3 percent 
agreed that the environment should be given priority over economic growth, and 60.6 percent 
said that economic growth should be the top priority, even if the environment suffers to some 
extent. See Figure 2. 
Germany 
 The 2014 Climate Action Programme is one of the most progressive pieces of climate 
change mitigation policy in the world. It commits to reducing greenhouse gas emissions by at 
least 40 percent on 1990 levels by 2020. The policy lays out reductions in the public electricity 
and heat supply, agriculture, industry transportation, commerce/trade/services sectors (2014, 15). 
Germany’s energy sector is the most greenhouse gas emissions intensive sector, at 40 percent of 
all Germany’s emissions in 2012, which the Climate Action Programme identifies as the sector 
with the “greatest technical and economic potential for reduction” (2014, 19). It includes 
Figure 1 (Schäfer et al. 2012, 20) 
  
Figure 2 (World Values Survey) 
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measures involving emissions trading, renewable energy expansion, and demand reduction to 
remedy its most emissions-intensive sector. Germany will engage in emissions trading, 
incentives to invest in higher energy, increases in regulations for reducing fluorinated 
greenhouses gases, and increases in renewable energy to target its industry sector (20). Germany 
will tax fuels used for heating purposes within households, and implement grant programs to 
promote renewable energy use in its heat market to reduce household consumption of energy 
(21). The policy sets concrete timetables and definitive reductions goals for each sector 
mentioned. It also places great emphasis on “responsibility towards future generations” (2014, 
9).  The policy does not however include measures to reduce international aviation and maritime 
shipping emissions. It acknowledges the need for future reductions in the forestry and timber 
sector (due to the carbon sink function of forests), but does not set concrete reductions goals for 
this sector. Germany also highlights achievements in its “other” sector, such as its closed cycle 
and waste management program that made it illegal to landfill organic degradable municipal 
waste, which resulted in emissions reductions of 67 percent between 1990 and 2012 (23). 
(“Climate Action Programme 2020”, 2014). Because the policy targets all emissions sectors 
identified by the United Nations, those being transport, buildings, industry, tourism, agriculture, 
forestry, waste and energy supply/renewables, and because it specifically targets Germany’s 
most emissions intensive sectors, The Climate Action Programme 2020 policy received a “1” on 
my policy scale.  
 Of 80.62 million Germans, 436,738 of them are staff or members of an environmental 
non-governmental organization, meaning that .54 percent of the population is directly and 
actively involved in an ENGO. 
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 Between 1996 and 2010, the German 
newspapers Süddeutsche Zeitung and the 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung covered climate 
change an average .41 percent of its total media 
coverage over time  (Schäfer et al. 2012, 21). 
See Figure 3. 
 To measure perception of climate 
change mitigation policy in general, I used 
2010-2014 World Values Survey Data 
measuring perception of the environment as a 
priority, namely whether the environment 
should be given priority, even if it causes slower 
economic growth and some loss of jobs. Of 2046 cases, 47.7 percent of Germans surveyed 
agreed that the environment should be given priority, while 39.1 percent believed that economic 
growth was more important than environmental protections. Interestingly, 10.4 percent had an 
“other” answer. See Figure 4. 
United States 
 While the United States has recently enacted several climate change mitigation policies, 
they all selectively target a single emissions sector. The most recent policy that works to target 
multiple emissions sectors is the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act of 1963/1970. The 
amendments, which this study will focus upon, require the issuance of technology-based 
standards for major emissions sectors (that have the potential to emit 10 tons per year or more of 
Figure 3 (Schäfer et al. 2012, 19) 
Figure 4 (World Values Survey) 
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a hazardous air pollutant or 25 tons per year or more of a combination of hazardous air 
pollutants). The Amendments focus on reducing the effects acid rain, which is of course a 
symptom of polluted air rather than a cause. They also eliminated some ozone depleting 
substances. They focus on the United States’ transportation sector, which is its most emissions 
intensive sector, by setting up flexible performance standards that combine cleaner fuels and 
more fuel-efficient technologies to reduce car and truck emissions, but also include measures in 
the industry sector. They also promote low sulfur coal and natural gas use and encourage the use 
of market principles like emission banking and trading, however do not set definitive timeframes 
or penalties for not utilizing these programs. The Amendments to the Clean Air Act, therefore, 
receive a “2” on my policy scale because it does not target all UN emissions sectors, though it 
does target the United States’ most emissions-intensive 
sector, being transportation. 
 The United States has a much higher number of 
ENGOs than most other countries, at 311, yet has a 
membership and staff population much lower than others, 
at 637,063 people. Adjusted per capita, .2 percent of the 
U.S. 
population is directly and actively involved in an 
ENGO (Encyclopedia of Associations: International 
Organizations). 
 Approximately .67 percent of media attention 
from the New York Times and The Washington Post 
mentioned climate change between 1997 and 2009, 
Figure 5 (Schäfer et al. 2012, 19) 
 
Figure 6 (World Values Survey) 
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with a gradual increase over time and then a spike in attention from 2006 to 2009 (Schäfer et al. 
2012, 21).  
 The World Values Survey found that 37.2 percent of Americans value protecting the 
environment over economic growth, compared to 60.2 percent of Americans who value 
economic growth over environmental consequences based on 830 total cases. 
 
Findings Discussion 
 Although conclusions are difficult to make based on the results of only three case studies, 
my original hypothesis was incorrect in some respects, and may hold true in others. I 
hypothesized that media attention on climate change and environmental non-governmental 
organization membership per capita are contributory factors to a public’s perception of climate 
change. I also hypothesized that a public who has a positive perception of climate change, that is 
one who preferences emissions-reducing policy over growing the economy, is more likely to see 
climate change mitigation policy implemented in their democratic governments.  
 Media appears not to influence mitigation policy perception nor the implementation of 
that policy. Both the United States and South Africa had higher media attention on climate 
change, yet the populations of both countries still perceive economic growth to be more 
important than environmental protection. Therefore, media attention does not lead to public 
support for climate change mitigation policy nor does it effect the implementation of that policy, 
and seems to have the opposite effect in my case studies, though further cases would be 
necessary to definitively conclude this.  
 However, Germany, with its dramatically higher rate of ENGO membership and staff 
support based on population also had a public that favored environmental protection over 
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economic growth. It also had the strongest climate change mitigation policy based on my scale. 
Based on these findings, in Germany, ENGO support may lead to this perception and policy 
reality, or it may merely be a reflection of the policy existence and other factors within German 
society.  As Schäfer et al. explains,  
 The situation in Germany is quite different. It seems that climate change has been early 
 established in the media and in politics as certain, serious problem about which science 
 agrees by and large (Grundmann, 2007: 419; Weingart, et al., 2000: 274f): Peters and 
 Heinrichs (2008: 14) e.g. find that the analyzed national and North German media 
 coverage “closely mirrors the position of the scientific community as documented in the 
 IPCC reports”…. Climate change has, at least since the mid‐2000s, become a central 
 topic for organizations of this environmental movement. Business and industry 
 organizations, in contrast, seem to have retained from massive intervention into the 
 debate – unlike the situation in Australia or the United States…Thus, we suppose that 
 both international and national political factors strongly affect issue attention cycles in 
 Germany (Schäfer et al. 2012, 23).  
 
 Additionally, the majority of Germans support 
climate change mitigation policy, which has 
translated to, or reflects, the implementation of one 
of the most progressive pieces of climate change 
mitigation policies in the world, though the 
direction of causal flow here is unclear. Although 
the scope of my study does not cover an explanation 
Figure 7 (World Values Survey) 
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of other factors beyond media and ENGO membership that might result in the unique German 
situation that seems to most closely be supported by my hypothesis, the topic clearly deserves 
greater research and further analysis in order to provide a model for other countries to strive 
toward if they are interested in reducing the impacts of climate change. 
 Furthermore, the similarities in perception of climate change mitigation policy between 
South Africa and the United States (see Figure 7) is noteworthy, especially considering the large 
differences in data for all other variables studied. Both South Africa and the United States have 
similar histories of racial inequality and discrimination, however the ways that this factor may 
affect the variables is also beyond the scope of this study.  
 Future studies would benefit from incorporating greater numbers of cases in order to 
concretely explain the statistical significance of the variables surveyed. They would also benefit 
from a more detailed analysis of the history of climate change mitigation policies in regard to the 
variables studied in order to more fully understand how national and international events impact 
media coverage, ENGO support, and policy perception.  
 While it appears the causal chain I initially hypothesized does not flow in a simplistic 
single direction, the states studied that have higher population membership in ENGOs have more 
positive perceptions of environmental policy, which seems to translate into more comprehensive 
policies. Though these findings are not conclusive, perhaps they can provide a doorway in which 
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